The Common Interest Doctrine and Disclosures
during Negotiations for Substantial Transactions
Anne Kingt

INTRODUCTION

During negotiations for corporate transactions, each party involved shares non-public information with the other party. Information shared during negotiations is instrumental in assessing the financial and legal risks of doing business. Sometimes, one of the parties
discloses communications protected by the attorney-client privilegesuch as a patent opinion letter or a memorandum assessing a corporate client's litigation risks.
Disclosure of a privileged document during business negotiations
appears to work an implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege,
meaning that the shared documents could be compelled in future litigation. Document sharing does not inexorably work a waiver: the law
of evidence recognizes that parties with a common interest may share
privileged communications without waiving the privilege.' Nevertheless, the "common interest doctrine" arguably does not protect disclosures during business negotiations. In order to come within the common interest doctrine, parties must share a common interest that is
"legal, not solely commercial,"2 and parties must anticipate collaboration in pending or future litigation.3 Under this definition, one might
argue, corporations engaged in negotiations do not share a common
interest because each party seeks to maximize its commercial gain
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1
See, for example, Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 76 (2000) (recognizing the common interest doctrine, and stating that "[ilf two or more clients with a common
interest in a litigated or nonlitigated matter ...agree to exchange information concerning the
matter," and their communication of such information "otherwise qualifies as privileged," then
the communication "is privileged as against third persons").
2
DuPlan Corp v Deering Milliken Inc,397 F Supp 1146, 1172 (D SC 1974) ("A community of interest exists among different persons or separate corporations where they have an
identical legal interest with respect to the subject matter of a communication between an attorney and a client concerning legal advice.").
3
Id. See also note 77 (noting that courts will apply common interest protection even when
anticipated litigation is far in the future).
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through the transaction. And the choice to disclose a privileged docu-

ment suggests that the corporation assigns greater value to the outcome of the transaction than it assigns to the privilege.
However, when two corporations are negotiating a substantial
transaction - such as a merger, a substantial asset sale, or a subsidiary
divestiture -there is a stronger case that a common interest exists be-

tween the parties. In particular, when parties to negotiations contemplate a change of control from one party to the other, their negotiations
are likely to touch on how future litigation might affect both parties.
The timing of the disclosure is also relevant to the question of

waiver. During the course of substantial transactions, potential buyers
conduct rigorous due diligence review, scrutinizing the seller corpora-

tion's files, records, and financial statements to assess the transaction's
risk.7 Disclosures during due diligence arguably warrant different
treatment than disclosures made during the initial stages of negotiations. The parties to the contemplated transaction are less likely to
have adverse interests at this late stage of negotiations. Also, the case

for implied waiver is weaker because strong norms, based in legal
rules, influence the practice of due diligence disclosure.

Most courts conclude that disclosures made during transaction
negotiations work a waiver of the attorney-client privilege, and thus

4
See Oak Industries v Zenith Industries, 1988 US Dist LEXIS 7985, *11 (ND Ill)
("[W]hatever the common interest shared by parties at the negotiating table, it is insufficient to
warrant [common interest protection].").
5
This Comment will use the phrase "substantial transaction" to refer to major transactions that involve a change in control of a corporation or a substantial portion of a corporation,
such as a merger or subsidiary divestiture, the sale of a division, or a transfer of substantial assets.
As used in this Comment, a substantial transaction is one in which process duty of care is implicated. See Smith v Van Gorkom, 488 A2d 858, 872 (Del 1985) (establishing the requirement that
directors inform themselves about the risks and benefits of major transactions before voting to
approve or reject such a proposed transaction). See also text accompanying note 18 (discussing
process duty of care). "Substantial transaction," as used here, does not refer, for example, to
minor sales of assets or sales of goods or services.
6
For the purposes of this Comment, "due diligence" will refer to pretransaction review
for the purpose of assessing the transaction's risks and synergies, not review in preparation for
securities offerings. One commentator suggests that the process of "due diligence" as practiced in
contemporary corporate transactions has roots in the due diligence defense to actions under the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Act of 1934. See David A. Katz, Due Diligence in Acquisition Transactions,in Conducting Due Diligence 2005 245, 249 (Practising Law Institute). Also,
this Comment will focus primarily on buyer due diligence rather than seller due diligence, which is
less extensive. "The seller usually conducts a far more limited investigation designed to assure itself
that it has satisfied relevant regulatory obligations." Jeffrey C. Fort, Roger W Patrick, and Maribeth
Flowers, Due Diligence for Environmental Issues in Transactions,in Attorney's Guide to Environmental Liability in Transactions § 1, § 1.1 (Illinois Institute for Continuing Education 1991).
7
See Katz, Due Diligence in Acquisition Transactionsat 250 (cited in note 6) ("[Ihe term due
diligence refers to... the investigation that is part of nearly every... corporate acquisition.").
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courts decline to allow common interest protections But a few courts
hold that disclosures during negotiations for a substantial transaction
may be protected under the common interest doctrine.9 Hence, with
respect to substantial transactions, courts are split as to whether common interest protection applies to disclosures made during negotiations. Because the law is unsettled on this point, it is difficult for corporations engaged in a transaction to predict whether, in a future action, courts will find that they shared a common interest at the time of
disclosure. This Comment argues that, to best accord with corporate
law's preference for predictability in transaction planning but still
avoid allowing excessive privilege, courts should apply common interest protection only when certain factors are present.

Part I offers an overview of substantial corporate transactions, including a description of due diligence review, the legal rules that influence disclosure of information during due diligence review, and the
law governing succession of liabilities in substantial transactions. Part
II outlines the law of the attorney-client privilege and the evolution of
the common interest doctrine. Part III discusses how courts apply the
common interest doctrine when corporations share privileged communications during the course of business transactions, and outlines
courts' divergent positions regarding disclosures made during the

course of substantial transactions. Part IV identifies a set of circumstances under which common interest protection is most justified because (1) objective indicators suggest a common interest existed between the two corporations at the time of disclosure, and (2) adverse
interests did not overwhelm the corporations' common interest. This
Comment argues that courts should recognize a presumption that substantial transaction disclosures are protected under the common in8
See, for example, Libbey Glass,Inc v Oneida, Ltd, 197 FRD 342, 349 (ND Ohio 1999)
(declining to allow protection on the grounds that "Oneida sought commercial gain, not legal
advantage, through disclosure of its lawyer's advice"); Oak Industries, 1988 US Dist LEXIS 7985
at *11 (declining to allow protection on the grounds that expanding the privilege "would quickly
swallow up the general rule that disclosure waives the attorney-client privilege"); SCM Corp v
Xerox Corp, 70 FRD 508, 525 (D Conn 1976) (declining to allow protection of information disclosed during negotiations on the grounds that the party seeking protection failed to show that
there was a "reasonable basis for assuming that the [shared information] ... sufficiently concerned the risk of [the negotiation partners'] shared exposure to liability").
9 See, for example, Tenneco PackagingSpecialty & Consumer Products,Inc v S.C Johnson
& Son, Inc, 1999 US Dist LEXIS 15433, *7 (ND Ill 1999) (restating the common interest rule and
holding that legal advice shared during due diligence falls within it); Rayman v American Charter
FederalSavings & Loan Association, 148 FRD 647,653-55 (D Neb 1993) (holding that disclosure
of documents to a negotiation partner regarding a pending lawsuit did not waive the attorney-client
privilege), revd on other grounds, 75 F3d 349 (8th Cir 1996); Hewlett-PackardCo v Bausch & Lomb,
Inc, 115 FRD 308,310 (ND Cal 1987) ("[I]t seems clear that defendant and [its negotiation partner,
with whom it shared documents] anticipated litigation in which they would have a common interest.
Moreover, their common interest would have been in identical issues of law and fact.").
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terest doctrine only where two factors are satisfied: (1) disclosure occurred during due diligence review, and (2) the transaction, if consummated, would lead to succession of liability.
I. SUBSTANTIAL TRANSACTIONS

When corporations contemplate a substantial transaction- that
is, a large scale transaction that may result in transfer of liabilities
from one corporation to another'

-the

potential buyer and seller take

great care in evaluating the transaction's risks, including the liabilities
that will transfer. This Part offers an overview of due diligence review

and concludes with a brief summary of the law governing succession
of liabilities.

A. Due Diligence Review
During due diligence review a seller (or target) typically makes
available relevant documents in a secured data room or via a secured
due diligence website." Although a seller initially controls which
documents it provides to a potential buyer, a sophisticated buyer will
likely request access to additional documents. A buyer's request, like a

request for document production during discovery, will be phrased in
very general terms that capture a wide range of documents. 2 Because
a seller will likely give potential buyers access to confidential docu-

ments, the parties to a transaction normally enter into a confidentiality
agreement.13

Due diligence review, the "detailed investigations necessary to informed decisions about acquisition[s]" or mergers," is a critical phase
10 For a more detailed definition of "substantial transaction," see note 5.
11 See Committee on Negotiated Acquisitions, The M&A Process:A PracticalGuide for
the Business Lawyer 179-81 (ABA 2005) (describing the advantages and disadvantages of virtual
data rooms). A data room will be available in solicited transactions (especially auctions), but
typically is not available in the takeover context. "In the context of an unsolicited transaction,
the potential acquirer must be prepared to act on the basis of available public information."
Katz, Due Diligence in Acquisition Transactionsat 252 (cited in note 6).
12 One sample due diligence document request, for example, asks that the seller tender
"[a]ll correspondence with, reports of or to, filings with, or other material information with respect to any other regulatory bodies which regulate a material portion of the Company's business." Id at 311. One can imagine that certain privileged documents, such as an opinion letter
assessing the company's risk of violating a given regulation, would fall under that description.
13 Id at 252 ("I[T]he potential acquiror will have signed some form of confidentiality agreement in exchange for confidential information regarding the target company."). "If the transaction does not proceed, confidentiality agreements usually require the return of the information
and destruction of.any documents which contain the information." Id at 301.
14 In re Integrated Resources, Inc, 147 BR 650, 654 (SDNY 1992). One commentator summarized the "investigation's" goals as follows: "[Ilt can limit professional liability, identify areas
of weakness in the target company, identify possible synergies following the transaction, and
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of substantial transactions. " The information collected during due diligence review affects the transaction's final price, influences the parties' negotiation of indemnification clauses, and may even lead to
abandonment of the transaction. For example, upon finding a significant risk, a potential buyer may lower its bid. Also, in a contract to
purchase assets, information gleaned during due diligence may lead
the buyer to propose tailored indemnification clauses to insulate itself
from risk.' 6 Although proposed contracts typically include boilerplate
indemnification clauses, due diligence better equips the buyer to negotiate clauses accurately reflecting the transaction's liability risks.'7 Finally, if risks cannot be off-set by a lower price or indemnification, the
buyer may abandon the transaction.
Another function of due diligence is to shield the corporation's
management from liability. Corporate directors view due diligence as
a means to avoid process duty of care liability, which requires that directors inform themselves about the risks and benefits associated with
corporate decisions. Directors considering a substantial transaction
use the due diligence process to inform themselves about potential
risks; hence, a due diligence investigation offers protection from process duty of care liability.
In addition to its liability-protection and risk-assessment functions, due diligence has a third function: it eases a buyer's posttransaction transition. During due diligence, a buyer acquires knowledge about the operation and management of the corporation, division, or assets it seeks to acquire. This acquired knowledge-and resulting reduction in transition costs-adds to the value of due diligence review for the buyer.

generally provide relevant information for the management of the new entity." William M.
Brown, GrandfatheringCan Seriously Damage Your Wealth: Due Diligence in Mergers and Acquisitions of Medical Device Companies, 36 Gonz L Rev 315,340 (2001).
15 Due diligence review is particularly important in transactions involving closely held
corporations. Information about publicly held corporations is widely available, but an entity
contemplating a transaction with a closely held corporation likely has access to very little information on which to base an assessment of the transaction's financial risk.
16 See Katz, Due Diligence in Acquisition Transactionsat 251 (cited in note 6) (noting that
information acquired during diligence will affect the price of the transaction, "including any
post-transaction indemnification obligations").
17 See Tarek N. Fahmi, IP Due Diligence:Methodologies and Practices,in Handling Intellectual Property in Business Transactions2004 841, 849-50 (Practicing Law Institute) ("[D]ue diligence can be used as a foundation for allocating risk among the parties to a transaction through
appropriate contractual provisions.... Too often, companies will attempt to use boilerplate representations and warranties in an agreement as a substitute for proper due diligence.").
18 See, for example, Smith v Van Gorkom, 488 A2d 858, 872 (Del 1985) (establishing that
the business judgment rule applies only when directors have made an informed decision).
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Due diligence is costly for both buyers and sellers." Both parties
incur costs for the lawyers and accountants who oversee the due diligence process, and a seller incurs costs in gathering documents." As
outlined above, the benefits of due diligence review accrue primarily to
buyers. But if a planned transaction is not consummated, a would-be
buyer gains no benefit from its outlay.2 Thus, given the significant costs
associated with due diligence review, parties' willingness to enter this
phase of a transaction is a predictor of the transaction's consummation.
B.

Succession of Liabilities in Substantial Transactions

Transfer of liabilities between the parties to a substantial transaction depends on whether the transaction results in succession-that is,
automatic assumption of liabilities. If a buyer does not succeed to the
seller's liabilities, parties must engage in negotiations to determine
what liabilities will transfer. The transaction's structure dictates
whether a buyer corporation will automatically succeed to the seller
corporation's liabilities. In a merger, the surviving corporation suc-

19 See Katz, Due Diligence in Acquisition Transactions at 258 (cited in note 6) ("The due
diligence process may be very expensive due, in part, to the mass of documentation to be obtained and reviewed, and the time consuming work to prepare detailed written reports."). It is
difficult to state precisely the cost of due diligence, although the expense involved might be
roughly estimated by looking to "break-up fees." Break-up fees, which are "paid to a potential
acquiror of a business, or certain assets, by the seller, in the event that the transaction contemplated fails to be consummated and certain criteria in the purchase agreement are met," In re
Integrated Resources, Inc, 135 BR 746, 750 (Bankr SDNY 1992), serve as a type of liquidated
damages provision. "Break-up fees may take the form of paying the [acquiror's] out-of-pocket
expenses incurred in arranging the deal, including due diligence expenses, or break-up fees may
be wholly independent of the transaction costs[, possibly encompassing] a bidder's lost opportunity costs." Id. Bankruptcy decisions offer good data on the scope of break-up fees, because the
court must approve such fees. See, for example, Integrated Resources, 135 BR at 753 (approving a
break-up fee of $6 million attached to an offer to loan $565 million); In re 995 Fifth Avenue
Associates, LP, 96 BR 24, 28 (Bankr SDNY 1989) (approving a $500,000 break-up fee attached
to a $73 million bid). Of course, these figures offer only a rough idea because break-up fees may
compensate for other losses, see Integrated Resources, 135 BR at 750, but they offer a sense of
the expense involved in due diligence review.
20
See Katz, Due Diligence in Acquisition Transactionsat 261 (cited in note 6) (noting that
"it will normally be necessary to employ a team of lawyers (and perhaps investment bankers and
other specialists)").
21 See id at 300 ("[Due diligence] becomes a very expensive process for the acquiror if it
chooses to terminate the process or to bear extra costs if items which should have been taken
into account during the due diligence investigation arise later in the process."). See also Committee on Negotiated Acquisitions, The M&A Process at 190 (cited in note 11) ("There are risks to
the buyer in being involved in an unsuccessful purchase. While the consequences of completing a
bad deal almost always outweigh the consequences of not doing a particular deal, the latter
consequences are not insignificant.").
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ceeds to the liabilities and assets of the target corporation,2 including
the target corporation's privileges) In an asset sale, however, the
buyer does not automatically succeed to the seller's liabilities. 4 The
rationale for the asset sale default rule "is the interest in a fluid market in corporate assets, which is impeded if purchasers acquire along
with the assets legal liabilities of unknown, sometimes unknowable,

dimensions.""
There are several exceptions to the default rule for asset sales." Suc-

cessor liability-that is, automatic liability for asset purchasers- applies
under certain circumstances to ensure that a dissolved corporation's

creditors have the opportunity to pursue a remedy. The basic requirements for successor liability are "continuity between the predecessor's
and successor's businesses and the latter's notice of the former's acts.""
Certain exceptions to the asset sale default rule-the mere con-

tinuation, de facto merger, and fraudulent transfer
exceptions-are
°

primarily intended to prevent fraud to creditors. For example, with-

22 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, CorporationLaw and Economics § 12.3(A) at 623 (Foundation 2002) (noting that "the survivor [corporation] will have succeeded by operation of law to all
of the assets, liabilities, rights, and obligations of the two constituent corporations").
23 Similarly, in a triangular merger, the newly created subsidiary succeeds to the liabilities
of the target corporation. See id § 12.3(C) at 630 ("After a triangular merger, the target remains
in existence as a wholly owned subsidiary of the true acquirer.... [T]he parent acquiring corporation's exposure to successor liability is limited to its investment in the acquired subsidiary.").
To effect a triangular merger, the acquiring company creates a subsidiary, which then merges
with the target. Id. A somewhat analogous result follows from a stock acquisition in which the
target becomes a subsidiary of the buyer. The target's pre-sale liabilities are confined to the
subsidiary; the buyer faces liability only through piercing of the corporate veil. See Brown, 36
Gonz L Rev at 325-26 (cited in note 14) (discussing the state of a target's pre-sale liabilities after
a stock sale).
24 See Ruiz v Blentech Corp, 89 F3d 320, 324 (7th Cir 1996) (describing the default rule in
asset sales as "a basic rule about corporate successor liability").
25 EEOC v Vucitech, 842 F2d 936, 944 (7th Cir 1988) (describing the common law rule,
"now eroding, that in a sale of assets ... a purchaser took free of any liabilities not expressly
assumed, including tort liabilities") (citations omitted).
26 Successor liability exceptions vary by state. See Ruiz, 89 F3d at 324 (discussing state-law
exceptions to the general rule against successor liabilities in asset purchases).
27 Vucitech, 842 F2d at 944.
28 A "mere continuation" is "an entity that differ[s] only formally from its successor."
Michael D. Green, Successor Liability: The Superiority of Statutory Reform to Protect Products
Liability Claimants, 72 Cornell L Rev 17, 23 (1986) ("A successor whose ownership, management, and corporate operations are the same as its predecessor is not a separate economic entity
simply because of formalistic changes. Thus, the economic unit that incurred the liability remains
responsible for it.").
29 A "de facto merger" is a judicial finding of merger although the deal was structured as an
asset sale: the "court re-characterizes an asset transfer as though it were a statutory merger of the
transferor with the transferee because the transferee is, in substance, indistinguishable from the
transferor." Marie T. Reilly, Making Sense of Successor Liability, 31 Hofstra L Rev 745,747 (2003).
30 See id at 750-51 (arguing that fraud concerns underlie the de facto merger and mere
continuation rationale for successor liability, in addition to the fraudulent transfer rationale).
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out the guarantee of successor liability in cases of mere continuations,
an entity could transfer substantially all of its assets to another entity
and then dissolve, leaving no entity liable for residual debts. However,
policy concerns also animate successor liability exceptions. For example, one rationale for the product line successor liability rule-which
applies when the purchaser acquires an entire product line-is the
idea that manufacturers can manage product risk more efficiently
than consumers."
Federal courts also impose successor liability on a purchaser of
assets when that purchaser has notice that the seller corporation could

have been liable under certain federal statutes. For example, a successor may be liable for Title VII employment claims-2 or environmental
claims3 based on its predecessor's practices. For federal successor liability, notice of a possible claim is not sufficient; there must be "substantial continuity between predecessor and successor.""
Finally, succession of liabilities is relevant to whether the attorney-client privilege is transferred in a substantial transaction. In a
merger, the target corporation's attorney-client privilege always transfers to the surviving corporation." Also, privilege passes to the buyer
in the sale of a subsidiary." In a simple asset sale, the privilege does
not necessarily transfer; the seller may still hold control.3 7 However,
under some circumstances the privilege does transfer through an asset
sale; the existence of successor liability may allow the buyer to assert
the attorney-client privilege as to the assets it purchased. 8

31 See Green, 72 Cornell L Rev at 28 (cited in note 28) (naming justifications offered for
liberal successor liability, including the ideas that "from the perspective of an injured claimant,
the details of corporate acquisition are irrelevant ... [and] accident losses can best be minimized
by imposing liability on the successor").
32 See Rojas v TK Communications, Inc, 87 F3d 745, 749-50 (5th Cir 1996) (discussing
successor liability for employment claims).
33
See United States v General Battery Corp, 423 F3d 294, 298 (3d Cir 2005) (discussing
successor liability for CERCLA claims).
34 Vucitech, 842 F2d at 945 (quotation marks omitted).
35 See Commodity Futures Trading Commission v Weintraub, 471 US 343, 349 ("[W]hen
control of a corporation passes to new management, the authority to assert and waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege passes as well.").
36 See McCaugherty v Siffermann, 132 FRD 234, 245 (ND Cal 1990) ("Since the attorneyclient privilege over a corporation belongs to the inanimate entity and not to individual directors
or officers, control over privilege should pass with control of the corporation.").
37 Soverain Software LLC v Gap, Inc, 340 F Supp 2d 760, 763 (ED Tex 2004) (A "mere
transfer of some assets ... from one corporation to the other does not transfer the attorneyclient privilege."). See also Ramada FranchiseSystem, Inc v Hotel of GainesvilleAssociates, 988 F
Supp 1460, 1464 (ND Ga 1997) ("The mere sale or transfer of a portion of a corporation's assets
does not necessarily transfer the corporation's attorney-client privilege.").
38
See Soverain Software, 340 F Supp 2d at 763 (concluding that the buyer of an entire
product line could assert the attorney-client privilege as a successor).
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II. THE ATtORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND
THE COMMON INTEREST DOCTRINE

The common interest doctrine permits coordination of efforts by
separate parties' attorneys, including disclosure of communications
protected under the attorney-client privilege. This Part provides a
background on privilege law, particularly as practiced in the federal

courts. Part II.D describes the evolution of the common interest as a
further protection of privileged communications.
A.

Privilege Generally

Evidentiary privileges are not lightly created or broadly construed.39 Overly broad privilege prevents the admission of relevant
evidence, and inhibits the truth-finding purpose of the courts.i0 Expanding existing privileges-or recognizing novel privileges -reduces
litigants' access to relevant information. Still, expansions or novel
privileges are justified when a "public good transcend[s] the normally
predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining

truth.""
The Federal Rules of Evidence leave privilege determinations in
federal question cases to federal common law. 2 Hence, federal courts
have the authority to craft privilege law-within limits. The Supreme
Court has imposed two principal guidelines for lower courts to follow.
First, the Court has endorsed the utilitarian approach 3 - which maintains that privilege is meant to encourage certain valuable communications that would not otherwise occur-to defining privilege.4 Lower

39
See United States v Nixon, 418 US 683, 710 (1974) ("[E]xceptions to the demand for
every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.").
40 See United States v Bryan, 339 US 323, 331 (1950) ("[Tlhe public ... has a right to every
man's evidence.").
41 Trammel v United States, 445 US 40, 50 (1980), citing Elkins v United States, 364 US 206,
234 (1960) (Frankfurt dissenting).
42
See FRE 501 ("Except as otherwise required ... the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States.").
43
See Note, Developments in the Law: Privileged Communications, 98 Harv L Rev 1450,
1472 (1985). Under Dean Wigmore's widely accepted utilitarian test, privilege is recognized only
when communications between parties were confidential when made; society benefits from
protecting the parties' relationship; confidentiality is essential to the parties' relationship; and
disclosure is more harmful than privilege protection. See id. Harm is assessed in terms of systemic harm, not harm to the individual parties. See id at 1473.
4
See Upjohn Co v United States, 449 US 383, 389 (1981) (applying the utilitarian test for
privilege inquiry and noting that "[t]his rationale for the privilege has long been recognized by
the Court"); Trammel, 445 US at 51 (noting that a privilege is only justified if it "promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence").
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courts are therefore bound to apply a utilitarian test. Second, lower
courts are further limited by the Court's warning that privileges "are
not lightly created nor expansively construed. ' 5
The Attorney-Client Privilege

B.

The attorney-client privilege protects communications between a
client and his attorney from compelled disclosure during the judicial
process." The utilitarian rationale explains the privilege as encourag-

ing communications that clients would fear making without protection.4 '7 The privilege protects only communications- not underlying
facts'-and attaches only to communications made for the purpose of
securing legal assistance. 9
Privileges generally have a policy justification that is extrinsic to
litigation. Under the utilitarian rationale for the attorney-client privilege, the privilege is designed to protect the relationship between the
parties, as is the case with other privileges such as the psychotherapistpatient5' or spousal privilege. 2 But the attorney-client privilege is less
easily pigeonholed within this conception; it also has a purpose intrinsic to litigation. In particular, the attorney-client privilege protects
clients' efforts to obtain legal advice, and consequently improves the
quality of litigation.
Corporations, like individuals, may invoke the attorney-client
privilege." The utilitarian rationale is also cited as support for the corporate privilege. The recognition of the corporate privilege indicates a
judgment that protecting communications between corporate representatives and attorneys is more valuable than exposing such commu-

Nixon, 418 US at 710.
See Upjohn, 449 US at 389 ("The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being fully
informed by the client.").
47
See, for example, Fisher v United States, 425 US 391, 403 (1976) ("[The attorney-client
privilege] protects only those disclosures-necessary to obtain informed legal advice-which
might not have been made absent the privilege.").
48 See Upjohn, 449 US at 395-96.
49
See Fisher,425 US at 403.
50
See Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Evidence under the Rules: Text, Cases,
and Problems 1 (Aspen 5th ed 2004) (noting that two justifications for recognizing rules of evidence
are to further substantive policies both extrinsic and intrinsic to the matter in litigation).
51 See Jaffee v Redmond, 518 US 1, 11-12 (1996) ("The psychotherapist privilege serves the
public interest by facilitating the provision of appropriate treatment for individuals suffering the
effects of a mental or emotional problem.").
52
See Trammel, 445 US at 53 (observing that the purpose of marital privilege is to "further[] the important public interest in marital harmony").
53 See Upjohn, 449 US at 394 (recognizing the corporate attorney-client privilege for a
corporation).
45

46
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nications. In Upjohn Co v United States," the Court gave an additional
rationale for recognizing the attorney-client privilege in the corporate
setting: receiving frank advice from attorneys allows corporate clients
to conform their behavior to the law." The Upjohn Court suggested
that corporations, in contrast to the average individual, require the
protection of the attorney-client privilege in planning their everyday
affairs, not just in responding to legal challenges."
C.

Waiver of Privilege

Privilege may be waived expressly, or it may be impliedly waived
based on a privilege holder's actions. The doctrine of implied waiver is
strict: any disclosure of privileged communications to an outside party
normally works a waiver. 7 There can be a great deal at stake in cases of
implied waiver, because waiver as to one communication on a certain
question works a waiver on all communications that address this question. 8 Moreover, discussion of the general subject matter of a privileged
communication may, but does not always, work an implied waiver. 9
There are few exceptions to the implied waiver doctrine. Only a
minority of courts recognize selective waiver, which preserves the
privilege except as to the entity to which communications were disclosed. ° The rationale courts cite in rejecting selective waiver doctrine
449 US 383 (1981).
Id at 392 ("In light of the vast and complicated array of regulatory legislation confronting the modem corporation, corporations, unlike most individuals, constantly go to lawyers to
find out how to obey the law.") (quotation marks omitted). Compare John E. Sexton, A PostUpjohn Considerationof the CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege,57 NYU L Rev 443, 464 (1982)
(noting that critics of the corporate attorney-client privilege "have argued that because of the
exigencies of the regulatory state and because of their general business needs, corporations
would communicate with attorneys even if the privilege were not available").
56
Upjohn, 449 US at 392 (observing that, in addition to reasons related to the degree of
regulation, corporations more frequently consult lawyers because "compliance with the law in
this area is hardly an instinctive matter").
57 See Note, 98 Harv L Rev at 1630 (cited in note 43) (noting that although courts have
carved out exceptions to the doctrine in practice, they continue to state it in "absolute form").
58 See Smith v Alyeska PipelineService Co, 538 F Supp 977,980-82 (D Del 1982).
59 See American Optical Corp v Medtronic, Inc, 56 FRD 426, 431 (D Mass 1972) (concluding that lawyer's disclosure of certain opinions during licensing negotiations did not waive privilege for communications).
60 Compare Diversified Industries v Meredith, 572 F2d 596, 611 (8th Cir 1977) (allowing
selective waiver when documents were disclosed to a government agency), with Westinghouse
Electric Corp v Republic of the Philippines,951 F2d 1414,1424 (3d Cir 1991) (declining to recognize selective waiver where a party disclosed documents to the Department of Justice pursuant
to a subpoena). The Westinghouse court likened the acceptance of selective waiver to "creation of a
new privilege allowing parties to disclose communications to government agencies." Id at 1425. The
overwhelming majority of federal courts adopt the Westinghouse position on selective waiver. See
In re Qwest Communications InternationalInc, 450 F3d 1179, 1201 (10th Cir 2006); In re Columbia/HCA HealthcareCorp Billing PracticesLitigation,293 F3d 289,291 (6th Cir 2002); United States
54

55
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is that it conflicts with the privilege's utilitarian rationale: "If clients
themselves divulge [privileged] information to third parties, chances
are that they would also have divulged it to their attorneys, even without the protection of the privilege."" However, although inadvertent
disclosure of privileged communications historically worked an implied waiver, 2 some courts have engaged in a balancing inquiry in
cases of accidental dissemination. And recent amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide a procedure that may be
invoked when a party unintentionally produces privileged documents:
upon the producing party's notification, the party who received the
documents "may not use or disclose [them] until the [privilege] claim
is resolved.""'
Implied waiver doctrine is grounded in the concern that privilege
operates to obscure relevant evidence. Some courts read disclosure as
evidence of intent to waive the privilege. Other courts justify implied
waiver on the reasoning that waiver should occur whenever the privilege holder's actions are inconsistent with the purpose of the priviv MassachusettsInstitute of Technology, 129 F3d 681,686 (1st Cir 1997); In re Martin Marietta Corp,
856 F2d 619, 623 (4th Cir 1988); The Permian Corp v United States, 665 F2d 1214, 1222 (DC Cir
1981). Compare In re LTV Securities Litigation,89 FRD 595,621-22 (ND Tex 1981) (allowing assertion of privilege as to documents disclosed to the SEC during an investigation). In 2006, the Evidence Rules Advisory committee proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence to address the split on selective waiver. Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 502(c) provides for selective
waiver when communications are disclosed to state or local government agencies. See Proposed
FRE 502(c), available online at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Excerpt-EVReport-Pub.pdf (visited
Sept 12,2007). See generally Kenneth S. Broun and Daniel J. Capra, Getting Control of Waiver of
Privilege in the Federal Courts:A Proposalfor a Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 58 SC L Rev 211
(2006) (describing the drafting process for Proposed FRE 502).
61 Westinghouse, 951 F2d at 1424, quoting Comment, Stuffing the Rabbit Back into the Hat:
Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege in an Administrative Agency Investigation, 130 U
Pa L Rev 1198,1207 (1982).
62
See Bank Brussels Lambert v Credit Lyonnais (Suisse) SA, 160 FRD 437, 443 (SDNY
1995) (discussing the different approaches courts take to the issue of inadvertent disclosure).
63
See, for example, id (observing that "an attorney who takes reasonable precautions in
discovery may avoid waiver even though he inadvertently discloses a privileged document," and
naming factors relevant to the reasonableness inquiry, including "reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure," "the extent of the disclosure," and "overriding
issues of fairness").
64 FRCP 26(b)(5)(B). The Advisory Committee observes that the rise in electronic discovery inspired the amendment to Rule 26(b). "When the review is of electronically stored information, the risk of waiver, and the time and effort required to avoid it, can increase substantially
because of the volume of electronically stored information and the difficulty in ensuring that all
information to be produced has in fact been reviewed." FRCP 26, Advisory Committee Notes to
the 2006 Amendments.
65
See Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege:Waiver and the Litigator,84 Mich L Rev
1605, 1618 (1986) ("Although truly intentional waiver is rare in privilege cases, courts often talk
of attempting to discern the privilege-holder's intention."), citing Suburban Sew 'N Sweep, Inc v
Swiss-Bernina, Inc, 91 FRD 254, 260 (ND I11 1981) (stating that the "relevant consideration" in
assessing implied waiver "is the intent ... to maintain the confidentiality of the documents as
manifested in the precautions they took").
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lege.6 Still other courts-and many commentators-troubled by the

implied waiver doctrine's categorical nature, offer a fairness justification for implied waiver." The fairness approach finds implied waiver
only when communications are incompletely disclosed and fairness
requires that the entire communication be disclosed to provide a
complete context.6
D.

The Common Interest Doctrine
A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent
any other person from disclosingconfidential communications
made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client.., by him or his lawyer to a
lawyer representinganother in a matter of common interest.69

When two parties share a common legal interest, communications
between them may be protected by the attorney-client privilege. Also,
these parties or their attorneys may share existing privilege-protected
communications without waiving privilege; work-product protected
documents may also be disclosed without working a waiver."' Courts
66 See, for example, United States v AT&T, 642 F2d 1285,1299 (DC Cir 1980) ("Any voluntary disclosure by the holder of [the attorney-client] privilege is inconsistent with the confidential relationship and thus waives the privilege."). See also Marcus, 84 Mich L Rev at 1607 (cited
in note 65) (describing the "purpose" justification for implied waiver doctrine).
67
See, for example, Remington Arms Co v Liberty Mutual Insurance Co, 142 FRD 408,413
(D Del 1992) (discussing the concern that parties may selectively disclose privileged information
to "garble the truth" and noting that, in this case, "fairness demands that the opposing party be
allowed to examine the whole picture"); Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc v Weaver Popcorn
Co, 132 FRD 204, 207 (ND Ind 1990) (concluding that an inadvertent disclosure did not constitute waiver given that the privilege holder was not intentionally engaging in truth garbling). See
also Marcus, 84 Mich L Rev at 1607 (cited in note 65) (describing the "fairness" justification for
implied waiver doctrine).
68 See Marcus, 84 Mich L Rev at 1608 (cited in note 65) ("[T]here is no reason for treating
disclosure to opponents or others as a waiver unless there is legitimate concern about truth garbling
or the material has become so notorious that decision without that material risks making a mockery
of justice."). Courts recognizing the common interest doctrine often approve-either explicitly or
implicitly-a fairness approach to implied waiver. For an explicit approval of Marcus's fairness
approach, see Hewlett-Packard Co v Bausch & Lomb, Inc, 115 FRD 308, 310-11 (ND Cal 1987)
("[In cases such as this, where the disclosure was in fact voluntary but not intended to create a
waiver, the court agrees with Professor Marcus that one should look at the 'explicit or implicit
undertaking by the recipient of the information to hold it in confidence."'), quoting Marcus, 84 Mich
L Rev at 1641 (cited in note 65). Hewlett-Packardis discussed in greater detail in Part III.B.2.
69
Proposed FRE 503(b), reprinted in Eutectic Corp v Metco, Inc, 61 FRD 35, 38 (EDNY
1973). Courts use a variety of terms to refer to this principle; this Comment uses the term "common interest doctrine" for the sake of consistency. A few sources cited in this Comment use the
term "joint-defense doctrine." The original language used in the source has, in most cases, been
retained when quoting from that source.
70 See, for example, United States v Gulf Oil Corp, 760 F2d 292, 296 (Temp Emer Ct App
1985) ("[I]n determining whether a disclosure is fatally inconsistent with maintaining [work
product protection] the existence of 'common interests between [the parties] should be consid-
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variously classify the common interest doctrine as an extension of the
attorney-client privilege7 or as an exception to the waiver doctrine."
The common interest doctrine is widely accepted in the federal courts,

and by state courts and legislatures."
The common interest doctrine, as applied today, evolved from the

narrower principle that separate attorneys for criminal co-defendants
may share trial strategies without waiving privilege. 7 Over time, courts
gradually extended this protection even where information sharing

occurred before criminal charges were entered. 5 Today, courts recognize the common interest doctrine when invoked by defendant or
plaintiff, by corporation or individual, and in both civil and criminal
76

matters. The common interest doctrine may also apply before litigation occurs, as long as the parties anticipate being possible targets of
litigation in the area of their common interest." If the parties sharing a
ered."'). In contrast to disclosure of privileged documents, disclosure of work-product protected
communications does not automatically work a waiver. Id. This Comment will focus on the attorney-client privilege rather than work product protection. Because disclosure of work-product
protected communications does not automatically work a waiver, the application of common
interest protection for transaction-related disclosures is less controversial.
71 See, for example, Waller v FinancialCorp ofAmerica, 828 F2d 579,583 n 7 (9th Cir 1987).
72 See, for example, DuPlanCorp v DeeringMilliken, Inc,397 F Supp 1146,1175 (D SC 1974).
73 Since its relatively recent emergence, the common interest doctrine has enjoyed wide
acceptance among the states. See, for example, Ala R Evid 502(b) (incorporating Proposed FRE
503(b)'s formulation of the common interest doctrine); Ariz R Evid 501 (following FRE 501 in
leaving to courts the task of developing privilege rules through the common law); Oxy Resources
CaliforniaLLC v Superior Court, 115 Cal App 4th 874, 9 Cal Rptr 3d 621, 634-35 (2004) (noting
that the California Evidence Code does not explicitly provide for a common interest or joint
defense privilege, but recognizing a common interest doctrine as consistent with the Code's waiver
provision). There is relatively little state court case law addressing the application of the common
interest privilege to disclosures during negotiations; given the degree to which federal evidence law
influences state evidence law, this Comment will focus primarily on federal decision
74
See James M. Fischer, The Attorney-Client Privilege Meets the Common Interest Arrangement: Protecting Confidences While ExchangingInformation for Mutual Gain, 16 Rev Litig
631, 633 (1997) (noting that the common interest privilege originated in the criminal context).
This principle was originally known as the joint-defense privilege, but as the doctrine expanded
beyond the criminal sphere, the term common interest doctrine came into use.
75 See, for example, Hunydee v United States, 355 F2d 183, 185 (9th Cir 1965) (protecting
communications made in a joint attorney-client conference to discuss the government's case against
two individuals who faced indictment as co-defendants); Continental Oil Co v United States, 330 F2d
347,350 (9th Cir 1964) (protecting communications between attorneys for separate clients when the
purpose of information sharing was to prepare their clients to testify before the same grand jury).
76
See United States v Under Seal, 902 F2d 244, 249 (4th Cir 1990) (collecting cases that
recognize the broad application of the common interest doctrine).
77 See, for example, Schachar v American Academy of Opthalmology, Inc, 106 FRD 187,
191 (ND Ill 1985) ("Although originally limited to cases of actual co-defendants, courts have
applied the joint defense privilege to cases of 'potential' litigation as well."). See also Nicole
Garsombke, Note, A Tragedy of the Common: The Common Interest Rule, ItsCommon Misuses,
and an Uncommon Solution, 40 Ga L Rev 615,625 (2006) (suggesting that courts provide insufficient justification for the expansion of the joint-defense doctrine); Gregory J. Kopta, Comment,
Applying the Attorney-Client and Work Product Privileges to Allied Party Exchange of Informa-
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common interest are subsequently engaged in litigation against one

another, common interest doctrine protection no longer applies."
The common interest doctrine shares characteristics of the work
product doctrine. One justification for recognizing the common interest doctrine is that it conserves litigation resources and promotes fairness.? Work product protection is similarly justified by the policy goal
of permitting litigants to develop their best possible case."o Further-

more, both the common interest doctrine and work product protection
require anticipation of litigation, are judicially crafted, and have
emerged relatively recently.81
Common interest protection may be applied if three require-

ments are fulfilled: "(1) the communication was made by separate parties in the course of a matter of common interest, (2) the communication was designed to further that effort, and (3) the privilege has not
been waived."" Some courts adopt a more rigorous approach to the

third prong, requiring that parties with a common interest take steps
to preserve the confidentiality of their communications."' With respect
to a disclosure made in the course of a transaction, the primary issues
in applying the common interest doctrine are whether a disclosure
was made "in the course of a matter of common interest" ' and whether
"the communication was designed to further that effort."
84

tion in California,36 UCLA L Rev 151, 155-58 (1988) (discussing the evolution of the contemporary common interest doctrine).
78
See Garner v Wolfinbarger,430 F2d 1093, 1103 (5th Cir 1970) (stating that "neither party
[with a common interest] may exercise the privilege in a subsequent controversy with the other");
In re Sunrise Securities Litigation, 130 FRD 560, 573 (ED Pa 1989) ("The joint defense privilege is
waived 'where one of the joint defendants becomes an adverse party in a litigation."').
79 See Deborah Stavile Bartel, Reconceptualizing the Joint Defense Doctrine, 65 Fordham L
Rev 871,914 (1996).
80 See Hickman v Taylor, 329 US 495,511-12 (1947). See also Bartel, 65 Fordham L Rev at
915-18 (cited in note 79) (comparing work product protection and the common interest doctrine).
81 See Hickman, 329 US at 511 (articulating the work product protection doctrine in a 1947
opinion); Continental Oil, 330 F3d at 350 (articulating the joint-defense privilege in a 1964 opinion).
82 In re Mortgage & Realty Trust, 212 BR 649, 653 (Bankr CD Cal 1997), citing In re Bevill,
Bresler & Schulman Asset Management Corp, 805 F2d 120, 126 (3d Cir 1986) (articulating a
three-prong test for the joint defense doctrine) (additional citation omitted). Prong one might be
expanded by a requirement that counsel for all parties be present at the time of the communication. See Libbey Glass,Inc v Oneida Ltd, 197 FRD 342,348 (ND Ohio 1999).
83 See, for example, Libbey Glass, 197 FRD at 348.
84 A possible argument against recognizing common interest protection for transaction
disclosures is that information sharing during transaction negotiations occurs too far in advance
of potential litigation to justify common interest protection. However, courts do not rely on this
argument, focusing instead on the nature of the claimed common interest. See, for example, SCM
Corp v Xerox Corp, 70 FRD 508, 514 (D Conn 1976) (noting that regardless of whether the
privileged communication referenced pending litigation or the possibility of litigation, "the privilege should not be denied when the common interest is clear"). Indeed, in contrast to individuals,
corporations frequently make use of legal advice when planning future actions, not only when
faced with immediate litigation. If the common interest doctrine is to be applied to corporations

1426

The University of Chicago Law Review

[74:1411

III. THE COMMON INTEREST DOCTRINE AND
SUBSTANTIAL TRANSACTIONS

A. The Common Interest Doctrine and Commercial Interests
The most widely cited test for what constitutes a common interest
is the formulation articulated in DuPlan Corp v Deering Milliken,"

where the court stated, "the nature of the interest [must] be identical,
not similar, and [must] be legal, not solely commercial. '' .. The strictest
reading of DuPlan's "legal, not solely commercial" language holds

that insertion of commercial interests significantly limits application
of common interest protection; that "calculated use of otherwise privi-' '
leged materials for commercial purposes will waive the privilege. n
For example, one court concluded that the common interest doctrine
did not apply when documents were shared "[i]n order to facilitate a
joint business decision."'" A more liberal understanding of the common interest doctrine questions whether a common interest must be
an identical interest. One court asserted: "The common interest privilege does not require a complete unity of interests among the participants. The privilege applies where the interests of the parties are not
identical, and it applies even where the parties' interests are adverse

in substantial respects."8 '
Applying the DuPlantest, courts typically conclude that corpora-

tions engaged in commercial negotiations do not share an identical
legal interest. For example, two corporations negotiating a joint ven-

ture could not invoke common interest protection for communicaat all, the nature of the corporate attorney-client privilege arguably requires a liberal interpretation of "in anticipation of litigation."
85 397 F Supp 1146 (D SC 1974).
86 Id at 1172. Applying this test, the DuPlan court found that sharing documents with an
exclusive patent licensee waived the privilege. Id at 1175. Some courts refer to this test as the
"Union Carbide test." See, for example, Rayman v American Charter Federal Savings & Loan

Association, 148 FRD 647, 654 (D Neb 1993), revd on other grounds, 75 F3d 349 (8th Cir 1996),
referring to a case that cited DuPlan.See Union Carbide Corp v Dow Chemical Co, 619 F Supp

1036,1047 (D Del 1985).
87
88

In Re John Doe Corp, 675 F2d 482,489 n 5 (2d Cir 1982).
Bank Brussels Lambert v Credit Lyonnais (Suisse) SA, 160 FRD 437,448 (SDNY 1995)

(declining to find a common interest among several banks that jointly extended credit to a corporation, although the banks later engaged in litigation against the corporation, reasoning that
"the common interest doctrine does not encompass a joint business strategy which happens to
include ... a concern about litigation"). The DuPlan view disapproves of such a restrictive view
of the common interest doctrine. "The fact that there may be an overlap of a commercial and a
legal interest for a third party does not negate the effect of the legal interest in establishing a
community of interest." DuPlan,397 F Supp at 1172.
89 In re Mortgage & Realty Trust, 212 BR 649, 653 (Bankr CD Cal) (applying common
interest protection to communications between a bankruptcy debtor and a coalition of creditors,
on the reasoning that, although the debtor and creditors were adverse as to certain issues, the
parties were aligned in opposition to an outside creditor's claim).
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tions disclosed during negotiations. One court reasoned as follows:
"That the overall profitability of the joint enterprise was a general
consideration in which both parties' interests converged does not
lessen the significance of their divergent interests."' Similarly, sharing
of privileged material during negotiations for the sale of goods has not
warranted protection under the common interest doctrine.9
B.

Application of the Common Interest Doctrine in
Substantial Transactions

Courts are split over whether common interest protection may
apply to disclosures made during substantial transactions. One line of
cases denies common interest protection because "parties at the negotiating table" have "insufficient" common interest to warrant exclusion of evidence. An opposing line of cases grants common interest
protection, reasoning that "courts should not create procedural doctrine that restricts communication between buyers and sellers [and]
erects barriers to business deals."'"
1. The Corningapproach: declining to recognize common interest
protection for disclosures made during substantial transactions.
One line of cases does not apply common interest protection to
disclosures by corporations contemplating a substantial transaction,
treating substantial transactions much like any other transaction.
Animating this line of cases is the idea that common interest protection is inconsistent with the adversary positions of parties engaged in
negotiations. In Corning,Inc v SRU Biosystems, LLC," the court did
not apply common interest protection to documents shared with a
potential acquirer because disclosure occurred "not in an effort to
formulate a joint defense but rather to persuade [the potential buyer]
to invest." 9' Another court, declining protection where a corporation
made disclosures to a potential buyer of one of its divisions, reasoned
that "whatever the common interest shared by parties at the negotiating table, it is insufficient to warrant [protection]."
For courts following the Corning approach, the structure of a
transaction carries weight in the common interest inquiry. In Cheeves
90 SCM Corp v Xerox Corp, 70 FRD 508,513 (D Conn 1976).
91 See, for example, Libbey Glass,Inc v Oneida, Ltd, 197 FRD 342,349 (ND Ohio 1999).
92
Oak Industries v Zenith Industries,1988 US Dist LEXIS 7985, *11 (ND I11).
93
See, for example, Hewlett-PackardCo v Bausch & Lomb, Inc, 115 FRD 308,311 (ND Cal
1987).
94 223 FRD 189 (D Del 2004).
95 Id at 190.
96
Oak Industries, 1988 US Dist LEXIS 7985 at *11.
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v Southern Clays,Inc," among other things, the court declined to protect communications shared in advance of a substantial asset sale, reasoning that the parties shared no common interest at the time of disclosure because "[i]f the corporation sells to another corporation its
entire business operation and all its assets ...the two corporate entities remain distinct and intact. ' The Cheeves court suggested that the
parties would have shared a common interest had the transaction
been a merger instead of a substantial asset sale."
2. The Hewlett-Packardapproach: recognizing common interest
protection for disclosures made during substantial transactions.
Another line of cases, by contrast, allows common interest protection for communications shared between two corporations contemplating a substantial transaction. In Hewlett-Packard Co v Bausch
& Lomb, Inc,"° the court found that privilege was not waived when a
corporation disclosed privileged communications during negotiations
with a potential purchaser of one of its divisions.10' According to the
court, common interest protection was warranted because both buyer
and seller could face patent infringement litigation over a patent that
would be transferred in the sale.1"" The Hewlett-Packard court offered
a policy argument on the proper level of court influence in private
party negotiations, asserting that courts should only impose legal doctrines affecting private transactions when absolutely necessary:
Unless it serves some significant interest courts should not create
procedural doctrine that restricts communications between buyers and sellers, erects barriers to business deals, and increases the
risk that prospective buyers will not have access to important information that could play key roles in assessing the value of the
business or product they are considering buying. 03
The court further observed that granting common interest protection
in such cases facilitates the operation of the adversary system, noting
that "[l]egal doctrine that impedes frank communication between
buyers and sellers also sets the stage for more lawsuits, as buyers are
more likely to be unpleasantly surprised by what they receive. '

97 128 FRD 128 (MD Ga 1989).
98 Id at 130-31.
99 Id.
100 115 FRD 308 (ND Cal 1987).
101 See id at 310.
102 See id.
103 Id at 311.
104 Id.
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The Hewlett-Packard approach does not depend on a transaction's consummation. In Hewlett-Packard itself, the contemplated

transaction was abandoned, but the court concluded that the parties
reasonably anticipated joint litigation because "at the time the [document] was shared, there was a real possibility that [the buyer] would

purchase [the division]."105 The Hewlett-Packard court's position on

abandoned transactions appears to recognize that, at the time of disclosure, corporations can never be certain that a transaction will be
consummated.",
Several courts have followed the Hewlett-Packard approach, rec-

ognizing a common interest between two corporations engaged in
negotiations for a substantial transaction.0 7 For example, in Rayman v
American Charter Federal Savings & Loan Association,"" the court
concluded that the common interest doctrine protected disclosures
made prior to a merger. The Rayman court acknowledged that the
disclosures involved commercial interests, but did not see this fact as a
bar to common interest protection.' ° In Tenneco Packaging,Inc v S.C.
Johnson & Son, Inc,"' the court applied common interest protection to
a patent opinion letter disclosed in an asset sale."' The Tenneco court
observed that disclosure occurred toward the end of negotiations:
"Dow Brands disclosed the opinion to SCJ during the course of due
diligence, when the asset purchase deal was largely locked up."'"2
Courts that follow Hewlett-Packardemphasize that allowing informa105 Id at 310.

106 For example, regulators might block a transaction under the antitrust laws.
107 Also, a few courts have applied common interest protection to work product shared
during the course of merger negotiations. See, for example, United States v Gulf Oil Corp, 760
F2d 292,296 (Temp Emer Ct App 1985) (finding that sharing of documents in contemplation of a
merger did not waive work product protection); Eagle Compressors, Inc v HEC Liquidating
Corp, 206 FRD 474, 480 n 2 (ND Ill 2002) (same) (dicta). Common interest protection of work
product differs somewhat from common interest protection of privileged communications because work product protection, unlike the attorney-client privilege, is waived only by disclosure
to a litigation adversary.
108 148 FRD 647 (D Neb 1993), revd on other grounds, 75 F3d 349 (8th Cir 1996).
109 See id at 653 ("The negotiations were aimed at completing a business merger.... Presumably, defendant supplied Metropolitan with information on this lawsuit so that Metropolitan
would be more fully informed of the potential liability it would take on by merging with [defendant]."). The subject lawsuit was ongoing at the time of merger negotiations, and the Rayman
court noted that "(tihis case provides less room for speculation than did Hewlett-Packard:litigation here was not anticipated; it was a reality." Id at 654. However, the court accepted the result
in Hewlett-Packard.See id.
110 1999 US Dist LEXIS 15433 (ND 11).
111 Although the opinion gives little detail on the scope of the asset sale in question, it is
clear that several patents were transferred in the sale. See id at *6-7. Given the substantiality of
the asset sale, this Comment groups Tenneco with cases addressing change of control transactions, rather than with cases addressing everyday transactions.
112 Id at *8.
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tion sharing during negotiations facilitates business transactions.'13 For
example, one court accepted a party's argument that "both companies
[involved in a merger] shared a common legal interest in ensuring that
the merger was appropriately evaluated and completed."'.
3. Comparing the Corning approach and the
Hewlett-Packardapproach.
The contrast between the Corning approach and the HewlettPackard approach can be illustrated by an example."5 Consider two
corporations-A and B-contemplating a merger. In preparation for
the merger, A and B allow each other access to business records and
other documents. A and B enter into an agreement providing that, if
the merger is abandoned, each corporation will return any documents
belonging to the other corporation. A and B abandon the merger.
Later, the United States government brings suit against B and argues
that B must produce a privileged document it shared with A.
Under the Corning approach, common interest protection would
not apply to the document B shared with A, and the privilege would
therefore be waived. A court following Corning might look to
Cheeves, where the court suggested that a common interest is more
likely in the context
of a merger.' However, given the abandonment
117
of the merger, a court following the Corning approach would likely
order production of the privileged document. By contrast, under the
Hewlett-Packard approach, a court would find that A and B shared a
common interest- especially if the court was satisfied that A and B
took steps to preserve the confidentiality of the communication."' The
fact that the merger was abandoned is not dispositive.
As the foregoing example illustrates, the fact that courts do not
consistently apply the common interest doctrine can lead to materially
different results. The DuPlan test does not offer courts-or corporations-a sense of when the common interest doctrine might be suc113 See, for example, Britesmile, Inc v Discus Dental Inc, 2004 US Dist LEXIS 20023, *9
(ND Cal); Oxy Resources California LLC v SuperiorCourt, 115 Cal App 4th 874,9 Cal Rptr 3d
621,642 (2004).
114 Cavallaro v United States, 153 F Supp 2d 52, 61 (D Mass 2001) (citing the HewlettPackard approach with approval, but declining to apply common interest doctrine in this case
because only one of the parties invoking the doctrine was actually represented by counsel at the
time of disclosure).
115 This example is based on the facts in Gulf Oil, 760 F2d at 293.
116 See Cheeves, 128 FRD at 130.
117 The transaction in Cheeves was consummated. See id at 129. It is uncertain how the
Cheeves court would view an unconsummated merger.
118 See Hewlett-Packard, 115 FRD at 311 (emphasizing that the parties took steps to preserve the confidentiality of the disclosed documents).
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cessfully invoked. "9 The test's uses of "legal" and "identical" Mat first
glance appears clear-cut, but, in practice, results in a wide range of
outcomes. In addition, hindsight bias' might influence courts in the
common interest inquiry. That is, if litigation emerges, and the parties
formerly involved in business negotiations are aligned, a court may be
more likely to find that the parties shared a common interest at the
time of disclosure.
Given the split regarding disclosures during negotiations for substantial transactions, corporations contemplating an asset sale or
merger cannot accurately assess the costs and benefits of disclosure.

Normally, the law respecting corporations favors predictability,'2 especially in transaction planning. The predictability of corporate law
gives corporations a sense of when litigation can be expected, which
allows corporations to better arrange their affairs. Evidentiary rules
applicable in corporate litigation should be predictable for the same
reason.

119 See Rayman, 148 FRD at 654 ("[Tlhe [DuPlan] test is not clear as to the meaning of
'common legal interest' and 'anticipate joint litigation."'). The difficulty in applying the common
interest doctrine is an inevitable product of its expansion. When the principle applied only to
criminal co-defendants, see, for example, Continental Oil Co v United States, 330 F2d 347, 350
(9th Cir 1964), determining what constitutes a common interest was straightforward. When the
common interest is applied in cases of "potential litigation," see, for example, Schacharv American Academy of Opthalmology,Inc, 106 FRD 187,191 (ND I1 1985), the inquiry is more difficult.
120 DuPlan,397 F Supp at 1172.
121 See Part III.B.
122 For a general discussion of hindsight bias, see Norman G. Poythress, Richard Wiener,
and Joseph E. Schumacher, Reframing the Medical Malpractice Tort Reform Debate: Social
Science Research Implications for Non-Economic Reforms, 16 L & Psych Rev 65, 99 (1992)
("What is difficult for the person with a hindsight perspective or outcome knowledge to do,
however, is to accurately describe or portray the probabilities and judgments that existed at the
time that the critical decisions were made."). See also Ulrich Hoffrage, Ralph Hertwig, and
Gerd Gigerenzer, Hindsight Bias: A By-Product of Knowledge Updating?, 26 J Exp Psych:
Learning, Memory & Cognition 566, 579 (2000).
123 See, for example, Speiser v Baker, 525 A2d 1001, 1008 (Del 1987) (emphasizing that
Delaware courts construing statutes governing corporations must strive to promote predictability because "most transactions ... are carefully planned and result from a thoughtful and highly
rational process"). There are examples of uncertainty in corporate law, such as the uncertain
application of the veil piercing doctrine. See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation,52 U Chi L Rev 89, 89 (1985) ("Courts occasionally allow
creditors to 'pierce the corporate veil' ..... 'Piercing' seems to happen freakishly. Like lightning, it
is rare, severe, and unprincipled.").
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IV. TOWARD A PREDICTABLE APPROACH TO THE COMMON
INTEREST DOCTRINE FOR DISCLOSURES DURING
NEGOTIATIONS FOR SUBSTANTIAL TRANSACTIONS

A. Pros and Cons of a Regime with No Common Interest Protection

for Disclosures Made during the Course of Business Transactions
The most predictable regime of common interest protection is
one in which common interest protection is not extended to any disclosures between parties engaged in negotiations."' That is, corporations would not face uncertainty if courts categorically denied com-

mon interest protection when communications are shared "in order to
facilitate a [ ] business decision."'' 5
1. There are strong arguments in favor of a categorical rule.
Arguably, a common interest never exists between parties engaged in negotiations for a transaction: two parties on opposite sides

of a transaction are fundamentally adverse.

6

And a blanket rule of

waiver would reduce the exclusion of evidence on privilege grounds.'"
Lastly, a categorical rule would simplify application of the common
"
interest doctrine for courts, thereby saving judicial resources.
However, there are compelling reasons to protect at least some
sharing of privileged documents between corporations contemplating
a change-of-control transaction. A categorical rule of waiver implicates the policy concern, aired in Hewlett-Packard,that courts should
avoid adopting evidentiary rules that interfere with private transac-

124 Another highly predictable regime is one in which parties are allowed to determine
when a common interest exists between them. One commentator suggests such a regime, and
argues that courts should enforce common interest agreements between parties. See Fischer, 16
Rev Litig at 643-44 (cited in note 74) ("[Tlhe parties' decision should be respected, absent additional, separate factors suggesting that the privilege should be deemed lost."). However, in such a
regime, parties who did not actually share a common interest-in the doctrinal sense-could
easily mimic those who do share a common interest. Assigning the common interest determination to the court, not the parties, ensures that common interest protection is applied only when
justified, minimizing the degree of evidence shielded from scrutiny.
125 Bank Brussels Lambert v Credit Lyonnais (Suisse) SA, 160 FRD 437,448 (SDNY 1995).
126 See, for example, Oak Industries v Zenith Industries,1988 US Dist LEXIS 7985, *11 (ND
I11)
(suggesting that "parties at the negotiating table" share little, if any, common interest).
127 See United States v Nixon, 418 US 683, 710 (1974) (emphasizing that privilege protection
is "inderogation of the search for truth").
128 Privilege determinations typically involve in camera review of documents for which
privilege is claimed. See, for example, Rayman, 148 FRD at 655 (noting that defendant, objecting
to plaintiff's document requests on grounds of "privilege, overbreadth and relevance," presented
ninety-five documents for in camera review).
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tions. ' And a categorical rule conflicts with the Supreme Court's formulation of the corporate attorney-client privilege.
2. But the Supreme Court's articulation of the corporate
attorney-client privilege forecloses a regime where the
common interest doctrine never applies to disclosures
during negotiations.
The corporate attorney-client privilege, in addition to protecting
the attorney-client relationship, also encourages corporations to seek
13
the legal advice necessary to conform corporate conduct to the law.
The Supreme Court's recognition of this additional rationale for the
attorney-client privilege indicates that corporations' frequent contact
with government regulation is an important consideration when establishing the scope of protection.'3
The purpose of the common interest doctrine is to allow parties
with a common interest to share information when litigation is imminent or anticipated. Given that, as the Upjohn Court emphasizes, corporations face significant government regulation,"' corporations are
likely to benefit from the common interest doctrine more frequently
than individual litigants. The additional regulatory burdens on corporations are also relevant to the question of how courts should apply
the common interest doctrine to corporate disclosures. A restrictive
approach to the common interest doctrine ' gives too little weight to
Upjohn's additional justification for recognizing the attorney-client
privilege in the corporate setting.
Moreover, courts should avoid overly rigid application of the
common interest doctrine to disclosures during corporate transactions.
First, because corporations must frequently consult counsel, corporations are likely to generate and maintain a large volume of privileged
communications. Given the sheer volume of privileged communications,
negotiations in the corporate setting will lead to sharing of privileged
communications more frequently than will negotiations between individuals." Second, much of the everyday business conduct of corporaSee Hewlett-Packard,115 FRD at 311.
See Upjohn, 449 US at 392.
131 See id.
132 See id. Heavy government regulation of corporations increases the likelihood of government litigation against corporations, but also renders corporations more vulnerable to suit by
private parties.
133 Compare id (criticizing the "narrow scope" of the control group test adopted by the
court of appeals).
134 Although confidential material is frequently shared in transactions between individuals, the
confidential material will likely not enjoy the protection of the attorney-client privilege. For example, a potential buyer of real estate might share confidential financial statements with the seller.
129
130
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tions implicates legal issues."' The DuPlan court stressed that a common interest must be "legal, not solely commercial."'3 If everyday business conduct is inextricably tied with legal matters, negotiations between corporations will inevitably touch on legal questions, and a
shared interest between two corporations will often bear legal implications.
Both the corporate attorney-client privilege and the common interest doctrine have emerged concurrently with the rise of the administrative state -which has augmented corporations' contact with government regulation'37 -and increasingly complex litigation. It is important that courts give full consideration to the Supreme Court's rationale for the corporate attorney-client privilege when establishing the
limits of the common interest doctrine.
B.

Under What Circumstances Is Common Interest Protection
Most Justified?

Instead of imposing a categorical rule of waiver, a better approach is to determine under what circumstances two corporations
contemplating a transaction are most likely to share a common interest and to determine under what circumstances the case for waiver is
weakest. When the common interest is strong, and when the justification for implied waiver is shaky, there is a powerful case for application of common interest protection. If courts recognize under which
circumstances application of the common interest doctrine is most
justified, they can presume a common interest when these circumstances are met, rendering application of the doctrine simpler and less
costly. If corporations know which factors will give rise to a presumption of a common interest, they will be able to plan transactions with a
better understanding of waiver risks.
The likelihood of common interest is higher when corporations
contemplate a substantial transaction -especially a transaction that
would involve a shift in management. However, protection for all disclosures during the course of substantial transactions would result in
overly broad exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence. This Comment proposes narrowing the inquiry by focusing on two questions:
135 In applying the attorney-client privilege to communications with lower-level employees,
the Supreme Court has recognized the degree to which legal issues are implicated in everyday
business. See Upjohn, 449 US at 394 (noting that the communications at issue "concerned matters within the scope of the employees' corporate duties").

136

397 F Supp at 1172.

See FTC v Ruberoid Co, 343 US 470,487 (1952) (Jackson dissenting) (noting the administrative state's ascendance during the last century and commenting on the broad reach of administrative action). See also text accompanying notes 75-78.
137
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First, what objective indicators of a common interest existed in the
parties' relationship when communications were disclosed? Second, at
what point during negotiations were communications disclosed?
1. Succession to liabilities as an objective indicator of
common interest.
When the contemplated transaction will lead to a transfer of liabilities from one party to the other, this fact is a strong indicator of
common interest. The parties may reasonably anticipate that joint efforts would be necessary in future litigation surrounding transferred
liability. Although a seller transfers its liability to a buyer, under certain circumstances the seller will not be immune from suit. '
Courts could assess whether liability will be transferred in a substantial transaction by looking to the terms of the deal between the
parties. For example, if the parties to a substantial asset sale agree that
the buyer would assume any liabilities stemming from the seller's employment practices, this fact suggests that the parties share a common
interest regarding employment liabilities. However, this approach is
flawed because the terms of the deal will likely fluctuate throughout
negotiation; parties may plan to transfer certain liabilities at the time
of disclosure, but later make changes to their deal.09 Because dickered-for transfers of liabilities are not set in stone before a transaction
is consummated, courts should look to an objective indicator that liability will transfer.
Automatic succession to liabilities is one such objective indicator.
Whether a transaction will result in succession to liabilities can be determined by looking to the structure of a deal. While parties may repeatedly renegotiate liability transfer terms, there is less risk that the
structure of a deal will fluctuate. Moreover, courts may look to existing rules for determining whether a transaction will result in successor
liability.' It is true that successor liability rules are not always easy to
apply-the Seventh Circuit described federal successor liability law as
"dreadfully tangled."" However, case law on successor liability may
138 For example, liability for contamination clean-up under CERCLA may arise against
both "the owner and operator of ...a facility" or "any person who at the time of disposal of any
hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which hazardous substances were disposed of."
42 USC § 9607 (2000). That is, both the current owner and a past owner of a facility
may face liability.
139 See, for example, Katz, Due Diligence in Acquisition Transactionsat 261 (cited in note 6)
(noting that due diligence informs buyers as to the appropriate price and terms to negotiate, and
emphasizing that the transaction's price should reflect any liabilities that are transferred).
140 See Part I.B. Some observers would contest that successor liability consists of clear rules.
141 EEOC v Vucitech, 842 F2d 936. 944 (7th Cir 1988). The Seventh Circuit characterizes
successor liability as "tangled" because it:..quires balancing two competing interests: (1) the
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serve as a guide, whereas, in practice, the common interest doctrine is
an ad hoc inquiry. Application of successor liability rules would therefore simplify the question of whether a common interest existed between parties at the time of disclosure.
Another reason courts should look to succession law is that successorship is tied to whether the attorney-client privilege transfers in a
transaction. 14 Privileged communications disclosed during negotiations are probably very valuable to the potential acquirer because
they address litigation risks. Post-acquisition, the acquirer will wish to
maintain privilege protection for such communications. By contrast,
privileged communications not disclosed during negotiations, and
which do not address litigation risks, are likely less valuable. It would
be a strange result to extend protection to less-valuable privileged
communications that transfer post-transaction while imposing implied
waiver on more valuable communications that were disclosed during
the transaction.
2.

The due diligence phase of a transaction as a time frame during
which corporations are more likely to share a common interest.

During the due diligence phase, the norms of buyer-seller disclosure change. Historically, under caveat emptor, a seller of real property has no duty to disclose defects.13 Contemporary doctrine imposes
a duty of disclosure when a seller invests little effort in acquiring relevant information, but the nondisclosure rule survives when a seller
invests significant resources or effort in acquiring that information.'"
In due diligence, however, seller corporations regularly disclose "defects" that were very expensive to discover. For example, a corporation may incur significant legal costs in determining whether it might
face CERCLA liability in the future. Nevertheless, a potential buyer
would likely expect that such knowledge be disclosed, despite the expense incurred. 5 In summary, the norm of disclosure during due dilipolicy of compensating for corporations' externalization of costs; and (2) the importance of fluid
capital markets where assets can be freely exchanged. Id. Although this balancing inquiry will
often pose a challenge for courts, using successor liability in common interest determinations
offers courts a clear sense of what interests must be weighed.
142 See text accompanying notes 35-38.
143 See Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure,Information,and the Law of Contracts,7
J Legal Stud 1, 22-24 (1978).
144 See id at 16. For example, when a seller knows that his house is infested with termites, he
has a duty to disclose this "latent defect" to a potential buyer. See id at 24, citing Obde v Schlemeyer, 56 Wash 2d 449, 353 P2d 672, 675 (1960) (imposing on a seller the duty to disclose to
potential buyers the existence of a termite infestation).
145 The buyer would expect that the seller's actual knowledge of CERCLA liability would
be shared given the unpredictable, potentially enormous scope of liability. See Fort, Patrick, and
Flowers, Due Diligence for Environmental Issues in Transactions at § 1.1 (cited in note 6) (em-
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gence is more demanding than the legal requirements generally imposed on sellers. This robust disclosure norm highlights that due diligence disclosures are in many ways distinguishable from disclosures
occurring earlier during negotiations.
Specifically, due diligence disclosures differ from earlier disclosures
in two relevant ways. First, the parties are less adverse at the due diligence phase. Second, the arguments for implied waiver are weaker when
disclosure occurs during the due diligence phase of a transaction."
a) The fact that negotiationshave reached the due diligence phase indicates a lower risk that adversity overwhelms any common interest between the parties. Because due diligence is an expensive undertaking for
both buyer and seller, the parties' decision to proceed at this stage indicates increased likelihood that the trasaction will be consummated.
Before the consummation of a transaction, the parties' adversary
positions overwhelm any shared common interest. Indeed, courts cite
adversity between parties as a barrier to common interest protection;
for example, one court states: "[W]hatever the common interest
shared by parties at the negotiating table, it is insufficient to warrant
[protection].'.' Of course, this concern disappears (or at least becomes functionally nonexistent) with consummation of a transaction;
if the parties anticipate litigation, a post-transaction disclosure would
of course fall under common interest protection. And, arguably, as a
transaction moves closer to consummation, such concerns lessen.'
Also, due diligence review involves extensive cooperation between parties. Although each party still pursues an individual agenda
during due diligence-the buyer, in particular, seeks to assess the
transaction's risk-the parties share an interest in completing the
process quickly and thoroughly.
b) The justifications for implied waiver apply less squarely in the
case of due diligence disclosures. This is the case because a strong disclosure norm-which is really the product of several legal rulessignificantly influences parties' conduct during the due diligence
phase of a transaction. Several legal rules shape due diligence disclosure practice. To avoid process duty of care liability, ' a sophisticated
buyer corporation will always request production of any documents

phasizing that it is essential for buyers to engage in environmental due diligence because environmental liabilities impose the risk of "being blind-sided by catastrophic losses").
146 See Tenneco, 1999 US Dist LEXIS 15433 at *8 (noting that the fact that disclosure occurred during due diligence weighed towards application of common interest protection).
147 Oak Industries,1988 US Dist LEXIS 7985 at *11.
148 See Tenneco, 1999 US Dist LEXIS 15433 at *8 (suggesting that disclosures later in the
course of negotiations do not implicate the same concerns that parties are adverse).
149 See Smith v Van Gorkom, 488 A2d 858, 872 (Del 1985) (imposing liability on directors
who failed to inform themselves adequately before agreeing to a merger).
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that go to any legal issues. In response to the buyer's request, a seller
will predictably disclose.'O If the seller possesses documents that fall

within the descriptions of documents requested by the buyer, withholding the documents may constitute misrepresentation. ' In theory,
the seller could indicate that it possesses relevant documents, but refuse to disclose the documents, thereby trading off privilege protection for a lower price."' In practice, however, the seller's refusal to
disclose -contrary to the prevailing norm-would send a strong signal

that the transaction carries significant risks. The buyer would likely
interpret the seller's refusal as evidence that the deal is a risky transaction. In summary, a legal rule-process duty of care-shapes the

norm, and the norm, in concert with the law of misrepresentation,
strongly influences the seller's disclosure.
Given the element of influence in due diligence, the rationales for

implied -waiver of privilege doctrine offer weaker justification for construing due diligence disclosures as waivers. 3 One justification for the
doctrine of implied waiver is that disclosure is evidence of the privilege-holder's intent to waive.', But because of the strong due diligence norm, the intent justification for the implied waiver rule is prob-

lematic here. Considerations other than intent to waive privilege motivate sellers who disclose during due diligence.

Another justification for implied waiver is that disclosure is inconsistent with the purpose of the privilege. However, voluntariness of

conduct is key to this justification, too. For example, one court expressed this justification as follows: "Any voluntary disclosure by the

holder of [the attorney-client] privilege is inconsistent with the confidential relationship and thus waives the privilege.""
The fairness rationale for implied waiver, which holds that a find-

ing of waiver is justified when a party's partial disclosure creates confusion or "truth-garbling,''..6 may apply to some due diligence disclo-

sures. However, waiver for fairness reasons involves a case-by-case
150 In some cases, the seller has a duty to disclose certain matters, independent of the
buyer's request for disclosure. The Hewlett-Packard court, for example, suggests that seller corporations have a duty to disclose that a division offered for sale is likely to face litigation. See
115 FRD at 308. However, the court notes that there was no duty (outside of due diligence) to
disclose a privileged patent opinion letter that would shed light on the anticipated litigation. See
id at 308-09.
151 See FDIC v WR. Grace & Co, 877 F2d 614, 619 (7th Cir 1989) ("An omission can of
course be actionable as a fraud.").
152 Compare notes 14-17 (discussing how due diligence information sharing affects the
price and terms of a substantial transaction).
153 See text accompanying notes 65-69.
154 See Suburban Sew 'N Sweep, Inc v Swiss-Bernina, Inc,91 FRD 254,260 & n 4 (ND 1111981).
155 United States v AT&T, 642 F2d 1285,1299 (DC Cir 1980).
156 See Marcus, 84 Mich L Rev at 1627 (cited in note 65).
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inquiry into the impact of disclosure."' Fairness considerations do not
undermine the conclusion that generally, the case for implied waiver is
weak respecting due diligence disclosures.
The element of influence in due diligence is not, by itself, sufficient justification for an exception to the implied waiver doctrine.
Courts rejecting the selective waiver exception to implied waiver doctrine emphasize that protection is not supported simply because an
entity would face unpleasant consequences if it did not disclose. For
example, one court noted that the fact that an entity found itself "between ...a rock and a hard place ...[was] insufficient justification for
carving a substantial exception to the waiver doctrine..' The fact that
the due diligence disclosure norm influences disclosure cannot, by
itself, protect privileged communications. But, in the context of the
common interest doctrine, the disclosure norm differentiates the due
diligence phase from other phases of the transaction.
c) Courts applying the common interest doctrine should treat disclosures during due diligence differently than disclosures during initial
negotiations. There is a lower risk that adversity overwhelms the parties' common interest when disclosure occurs during due diligence,
rather than during initial negotiations. Also, the case for implied
waiver is weaker for due diligence disclosures, indicating that courts
should tread carefully in reading disclosure to constitute waiver in
that context.
Furthermore, drawing the line at the due diligence phase simplifies the inquiry for courts. Parties to a contemplated transaction take
distinct actions to initiate due diligence;..9 the starting point of this
phase could easily be identified. Also, by the due diligence phase, the
parties will probably have decided how the transaction will be structured; at this point, the parties are less likely to restructure an asset
sale as a merger.'6' As a result, the relevant successor liability rule is
unlikely to change.

157 See id at 1649 (describing the fairness inquiry as a "multi-factor analysis to determine
whether it would be 'fair' to allow privilege holder to continue to assert the privilege").
158 In re SteinhardtPartners,LP, 9 F3d 230,236 (2d Cir 1993).
159 See Committee on Negotiated Acquisitions, The M&A Process at 196 (cited in note 11)

(describing, among other things, the establishment of a data room and the buyer's preparation of
due diligence requests).
160 Indeed, the transaction's structure will dictate how the due diligence review proceeds.
See Fahmi, IP Due Diligence at 857-58 (cited in note 17) ("Knowing what the contemplated
form of transaction is is [sic] an absolute necessity towards development of the due diligence
plan. Without an understanding [sic] the deal structure, the investigating attorney will not be
properly prepared for the investigating activities to come.").
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A Presumption of Common Interest
1. Articulating a presumption.

A regime where common interest protection does not apply to
corporations negotiating a transaction leads to predictability; however,
such a rigid rule denies protection in many cases where corporations
legitimately share a common interest. The Coming approach is therefore undesirable. By contrast, a purely ad hoc inquiry renders substantial transaction planning very difficult for corporations. A better approach is to apply a presumption under narrow circumstances where a
common interest is likely to exist. This Comment proposes that a presumption apply where two factors are met: where the contemplated
transaction would result in automatic succession to liabilities'6' (that is,
where the transaction is a merger or a substantial asset sale where
there is "continuity between the predecessor's and successor's businesses and the latter's notice of the former's acts"'' 2 ) and where the
privileged communications were disclosed during due diligence review
for that transaction.'6 There are two ways a court could structure this
presumption. First, courts might presume that there is a common interest under these circumstances. Alternatively, courts might presame
that there is no common interest unless the contemplated transaction
would lead to successor liability, and the disclosure occurred during
due diligence.
The former, broader approach gives corporations more flexibility
in planning transactions. The Hewlett-Packardapproach endorses such
flexibility, asserting that courts should not erect barriers to business
communications.'64 But the latter, more narrow approach has the advantage of preventing overly broad application of the common interest doctrine, which aligns with the Supreme Court's assertion that "exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed."'6 The narrow presumption is preferable because it limits the scope of common interest protection for dis-

161

As discussed above, some exceptions to the no-successor liability default rule for asset

sales exist in order to prevent fraud to creditors. Because courts will likely prefer not to reward
fraudulent conduct with greater privilege protection, the presumption could be limited to successor
liability exceptions-such as product line successor liability-that are not predicated on fraud.
162 Vucitech, 842 F2d at 944.
163 Tying successor liability and due diligence as an indicator of common interest would
help ameliorate a problem inherent to allowing claims against successors. "[The] fluid market in
corporate assets [ ] is impeded if purchasers acquire along with the assets legal liabilities of unknown, sometimes unknowable, dimensions." Id. Common interest protection allows successors
to uncover risks of liabilities during due diligence review.
164 See Hewlett-Packard,115 FRD at 311.
165 Nixon, 418 US at 710.
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closures during the course of substantial transaction negotiations, while
still addressing the Hewlett-Packard court's concern that courts should
avoid "imped[ing] frank communication between buyers and sellers." 6'
This Comment therefore recommends that, for disclosures made
during the course of a substantial transaction, courts presume that
common interest protection applies only when disclosure was made
during due diligence and the transaction would have resulted in succession of liabilities. This presumption should be rebuttable; corporations could still argue common interest protection for a disclosure
outside of due diligence or during the course of transaction that would
not lead to succession.
2. Objections and responses.
One possible objection to application of a presumption is that it
constitutes a novel privilege. Courts' discretion to invent privileges is
very limited. 67 However, the proposed presumption is not properly
characterized as a novel privilege; instead, it is a means to standardize
interpretation of the common interest doctrine, a judicially-created
concept. And the common interest doctrine's similarity to workproduct protection suggests that courts should enjoy more flexibility
in fashioning a new approach in this area.'6'
Second, proponents of the Corning approach may object that application of a presumption will lead to overbroad common interest
protection; that is, a presumption will result in exclusion of evidence
where disclosure should be compelled. To some extent, this is undoubtedly true: in some cases, corporations contemplating a substantial transaction will not share a common interest even when disclosure
falls into the succession and due diligence categories.
Courts can reduce the danger of overbroad exclusion to some extent through rigorous attention to the other prongs required for common interest protection. Even with adoption of a presumption, the
common interest doctrine applies only under narrow circumstances. A
finding that a common interest existed at the time of disclosure is only
one component necessary for application of common interest protection. The court will also consider whether "the communication was
designed to further [the anticipated joint litigation], 6' 9 whether "the

166

Hewlett-Packard,115 FRD at 311.

167 See Trammel v United States, 445 US 40,50 (1980) (asserting that a novel privilege may be

established only when "public good transcend[s]" litigants' right to uncover all relevant evidence).
168 See text accompanying notes 79-81.
169 In re Mortgage and Realty Trust, 212 BR 649,653 (Bankr CD Cal 1997) (citations omitted).
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privilege has ...been waived, '"" and whether the parties took steps to
preserve the confidentiality of the privilege.'
Also, the potential cost of overbroad exclusion is somewhat reduced because of the negative effects inherent in permitting discovery
of an adverse party's attorney product. Often, the document sought to
be discovered-for example, a patent opinion letter-will be valuable
to a party simply because an opinion expressed within the document
undermines the adverse party's current position. The Hewlett-Packard
court derides this practice, observing that "[p]reoccupation with efforts
to paint opposing counsel into some semantic comer or to take advantage of his choice of terms leads to costly, unproductive, and unseemly
disputes... 2 The demand for "every man's evidence" is less compelling
when fueled by desire to exploit an attorney's choice of words.
A third objection to a presumption is that distinguishing between
due diligence disclosures and disclosures during initial negotiations
will push corporations to disclose during due diligence. If the presumption influences corporations to disclose during due diligence,
then the fact that a disclosure occurred during due diligence is a
weaker predictor of common interest. This result would likely follow if
courts widely adopted the recommended presumption. However,
courts will still inquire whether the disclosure actually furthered the
presumed common interest, which will limit the effect of a shift towards due diligence disclosures.
CONCLUSION

The details of litigation can never fully be anticipated, and litigants will inevitably continue to find that prior conduct during business negotiations impliedly waived the attorney-client privilege. However, by presuming common interest protection under certain circumstances, courts can provide greater predictability to corporations engaged in negotiations for substantial transactions. This Comment
therefore recommends that courts presume corporations shared a
common interest at the time of disclosure only if disclosure occurred
during due diligence review and if the contemplated transaction
would have resulted in succession to the seller's liabilities. Even if
courts decline to adopt a presumption, corporations engaged in negotiations should consider whether their relationship bears objective
indicators of a common interest before disclosing privileged communications to further a transaction.
170 Id.
171
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Libbey Glass, Inc v Oneida Ltd, 197 FRD 342,348 (ND Ohio 1999).
Hewlett-Packard,115 FRD at 311-12.

